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Abstract
Research on risky and inter–temporal decision–making often focuses on de-
scriptive models of choice. This class of models sometimes lack a psycholog-
ical process account of how different cognitive processes give rise to choice
behavior. Here, we attempt to decompose these processes using sequential
accumulator modeling (i.e., the Linear Ballistic Accumulator model; LBA).
Participants were presented with pairs of gambles that either involve differ-
ent levels of probability or delay (Experiment 1) or a combination of these
dimensions (both probability and delay; Experiment 2). Response times
(RTs) were recorded as a measure of preferential strength. We then com-
bined choice data and response times, and utilized variants of the LBA to
explore different assumptions about how preferences are formed. Specifically
we show that a model which allows for the subjective evaluation of a fixed
now/certain option to change as a function of the delayed/risky option with
which it is paired provides the best account of the combined choice and RT
data. The work highlights the advantages of using cognitive process models
in risky and inter–temporal choice, and points towards a common framework
for understanding how people evaluate time and probability.
Keywords: Inter–temporal Choice; Risky Choice; Evidence Accumulation;
Cognitive Modeling; Linear Ballistic Accumulator
Introduction
You have just won the lottery and the prize is $10,000. Do you use your money now, or do
you put it in a bank account, for one year, and then take out $11,500? This choice is an example of
an inter–temporal choice, it involves tradeoffs between sooner–smaller (SS) and larger–later (LL)
options. Consider a second dilemma. You can either choose to keep the prize money in a savings
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account for a certain (probability of 1) return of $1,500 or you can take a trip to the casino and
put the $10,000 on your lucky number 17 on the roulette table. This is an example of a risky
choice, it involves tradeoffs between certain and risky but more valuable options. Most studies of
inter–temporal and risky choice have employed context-free monetary choice dyads between SS and
LL options on the one hand, for example, a choice between $10 now or $15 in two months (e.g.,
Chapman & Weber, 2006; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992), and between certain and risky options on
the other hand, for example, a choice between $30 for sure or $40 with 80% chance or nothing
otherwise (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Two hallmarks of traditional research on inter–temporal and risky choice are i) examination
of the two types of choice in isolation, and ii) evaluation of preferences in terms of their coherence
(or lack thereof) with normative economic principles. This large body of work has revealed key
insights into the types of factors that affect risky or inter-temporal choice, but “the interaction
between risk and delay is complex and not easily understood” (B. J. Weber & Chapman, 2005, p.
104).
In the domain of inter–temporal choice, the dominant approach is to examine whether choices
across time adhere to Discounted Utility Theory (DUT; Samuelson, 1937). DUT implies that
decision makers maximize a weighted sum of utilities with exponentially declining discount weights.
In the domain of risky choice, research has focused on Expected Utility Theory (EUT). EUT views
decision makers as maximizing a weighted sum of utilities with their probabilities of occurrence
(e.g., Epper, Fehr-Duda, & Bruhin, 2011; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991).
DUT and EUT are normative models of choice; they provide principles according to which
rational decision makers should behave (Newell, Lagnado, & Shanks, 2015). However, extensive
research has documented several violations of these principles (e.g., Allais, 1953; Thaler, 1981).
The standard approach to account for these violations is to modify the theories but to retain their
core constituents. Thus for inter–temporal choice, hyperbolic functions which allow decreasing
discount rates rather than constant (i.e., exponential) rates are used to capture observed choice
“anomalies” (e.g., Green & Myerson, 2004). For risky choice, allowing a non–linear probability
weighting function provides explanations of commonly observed behavioral effects and preference
reversals (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
These modified models are descriptive: they provide a description not of how decision makers
should behave but how they appear to behave when confronted with such choices (at least at the
Emmanouil Konstantinidis, Centre for Decision Research, University of Leeds, Leeds, England and School of
Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia; Don van Ravenzwaaij, Department of Psychology,
University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands; Şule Güney, University of Southern California, Los Angeles,
CA, USA; Ben R. Newell, School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
This research was supported by an Australian Research Council Discovery Project Grant (DP140101145) awarded
to the second and last authors.
Part of the computational modeling work was undertaken on ARC3, part of the High Performance Computing
facilities at the University of Leeds, England.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Emmanouil Konstantinidis, Centre for Decision
Research, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, England. E-mail: em.konstantinidis@gmail.com.
COGNITIVE MODELING OF RISKY INTER–TEMPORAL CHOICE 3
aggregate level, cf. Epper et al., 2011). Such models (e.g., Cumulative Prospect Theory for risky
choice and Hyperbolic Discounting for inter–temporal choice) are utility–based models: a utility
(or subjective value) is calculated for each option, and the option with the highest utility is chosen.
However, what these models lack is a psychological process account of why choices are better fit
by hyperbolic than exponential functions, or by non–linear than linear weighting functions (cf.
Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006). In other words, these models do not explain how the utility
of each option is estimated and the psychological processes that are involved. To answer this
“how” question requires the development of cognitive process models which specify the components
and relations between the (thought) processes engaged when making such choices (e.g., Appelt,
Hardisty, & Weber, 2011; Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky,
1993; Vlaev, Chater, Stewart, & Brown, 2011; E. U. Weber et al., 2007).
In the field of speeded multi–alternative forced choice decision–making, such cognitive process
models have been in use for almost four decades (e.g., Ratcliff, 1978; Brown & Heathcote, 2008).
The cognitive models of choice in the field of response time (RT) research are called sequential ac-
cumulator models. Among others, these models have been successfully applied to experiments on
perceptual discrimination, letter identification, lexical decision, categorization, recognition memory,
and signal detection (e.g., Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004; Ratcliff, Thapar, &
McKoon, 2006, 2010; van Ravenzwaaij, Dutilh, & Wagenmakers, 2012; van Ravenzwaaij, van der
Maas, & Wagenmakers, 2011; Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2008). Evidence accu-
mulation models such as decision field theory (DFT; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) and the leaky
competing accumulator (LCA; Usher & McClelland, 2001) have been applied in the domain of risky
choice, and the domain of inter–temporal choice (see Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; Rodriguez, Turner,
& McClure, 2014).
One of the advantages of such a modeling approach is that it allows researchers to decompose
observed RTs and choice proportions into latent psychological processes such as speed of cognitive
processing, response caution, and non–decision time. More traditional analyses make no attempt
to explain the observed data by means of a psychologically plausible process model.
One key difference between inter–temporal and risky choice on the one hand and traditional
RT research on the other is that in the former field, decisions are rarely timed (but see e.g., Dai &
Busemeyer, 2014; Rodriguez et al., 2014). Response times could potentially teach us a lot about
people’s preferences. For instance, consider on the one hand the choice between receiving $100 now
or $10,000 in two months and on the other hand the choice between receiving $100 now or $150 in
two months. In both instances, you might prefer the larger–later option. As a result, your choice
preference will look the same. However, the first choice was most likely a much easier one to make
than the second one. Your strength of preference in the first choice in favor of the larger–later
option was likely much larger. This strength of preference would likely be reflected in a lower RT
compared to the RT associated with your decision for the second choice.
Another difference between inter–temporal and risky choice and traditional RT research is
that the response options are about preference and as such, there are no correct answers. This
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presents a difference on the conceptual level, but on the model level, there are no obstacles as evident
by some recent applications of sequential accumulator models to preference data (see e.g., Dai &
Busemeyer, 2014; Hawkins et al., 2014; Rodriguez et al., 2014; Trueblood, Brown, & Heathcote,
2014).
In this paper, we present data from two experiments that contained both inter–temporal and
risky choices. In Experiment 1 participants had to make a choice between a small-sooner (“now”)
and a larger-later option for the inter–temporal choice trials, and a choice between a certain-smaller
and a risky-larger option for the risky choice trials. In Experiment 2 the inter–temporal and risky
components were combined within trials: participants had to make a choice between a certain-
now-smaller and a risky-later-larger option. In both experiments the now/certain options remained
constant across choice trials: $100 with certainty, right now. We pressed our participants to make
their responses as quickly as possible while still being able to show their true preferences. We then
applied a cognitive process model to the data.
One of the main objectives of the present analysis is to uncover the potential for a shared com-
ponent that drives decision–making in both inter–temporal and risky choices. Previous research has
identified several parallels and similarities between probability and delay. For example, Chapman
and Weber (2006) examined whether two well-documented biases in risky and inter–temporal choice
(the common ratio effect, and the common difference effect, respectively) can be accounted for by
the same underlying mechanism. Other studies have found evidence for psychological equivalence
between probability and delay, suggesting that probability can be translated or treated as delay
(e.g., Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991; Yi, de la Piedad, & Bickel, 2006), and vice-versa, that delay
can be treated as uncertainty (e.g., Baucells & Heukamp, 2010; Keren & Roelofsma, 1995). In
addition, recent theoretical and modeling attempts have assumed similar functional forms for delay
discounting (i.e., decrease of a reward value with increases in delay) and probability discounting
(i.e., decrease of a reward value with decreases in probability). For instance, Vanderveldt, Green,
and Myerson (2015) observed that a hyperboloid function of delay and probability discounting can
describe discounting patterns in both domains. While their hyperboloid model provides an excel-
lent fit to the choice data, it is a descriptive “as–if” model, in the sense that it does not account for
the underlying thought processes that drive preferential choice. With our cognitive process model
and the simultaneous examination of choices and RTs (i.e., strength of preference), we take the idea
of parallelism in delay and probability discounting one step further by exploring the potential for
a unifying psychological process that governs preferences in both inter–temporal and risky choices.
The model also allowed us to test to what extent the absolute attractiveness of the
now/certain options (which was always an immediate $100 with certainty in our experiments)
change with variations in the delayed/risky choice options with which it was paired. Such a test is
difficult with behavioral data or descriptive models of choice that typically only provide insight into
the relative attractiveness of two presented choice options.1 Following this, our model constitutes
1Descriptive models also provide measures of absolute attractiveness for each option, i.e., the subjective utility,
but it is the relative attractiveness that deﬁnes preferences and choice.
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a natural test of integrative expected and subjective expected utility-based models which assume
an overall fixed utility for each option irrespective of the context or the alternative to which it is
compared (see also Brandstätter et al., 2006).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we will introduce our
sequential accumulator model of choice: the Linear Ballistic Accumulator model (LBA; Brown &
Heathcote, 2008). We will then describe our experiments in detail. Next, we discuss the behavioral
results and then the modeling results. We conclude with a discussion of the gains of our cognitive
modeling approach and the lessons learned about the shared nature of delay and probability.
The Linear Ballistic Accumulator model
In the LBA for multi–alternative RT tasks (Brown & Heathcote, 2008), the decision–making
process is conceptualized as the accumulation of information over time. A response is initiated when
the accumulated evidence reaches a predefined threshold. An illustration for an inter–temporal
choice with two response options is given in Figure 1.
B
Figure 1 . The LBA and its parameters for an inter–temporal choice with two response options.
Evidence accumulation begins at start point k, drawn randomly from a uniform distribution with
interval [0, A]. Evidence accumulation is governed by drift rate d, drawn across trials from a normal
distribution with mean ν and standard deviation s. A response is given as soon as one accumulator
reaches threshold B. Observed RT is an additive combination of the time during which evidence
is accumulated and non–decision time t0.
The LBA assumes that the decision process starts from a random point between 0 and A,
after which information is accumulated linearly for each response option. The rate of this evidence
accumulation is determined by drift rates d1 and d2, normally distributed over trials with means ν1
and ν2, and standard deviation s, which we assume here to be equal for both accumulators. For this
application, drift rates are truncated at zero to prevent negative accumulation rates. Threshold b
determines the speed–accuracy tradeoff; lowering b leads to faster RTs at the cost of a higher error
rate (but see Rae, Heathcote, Donkin, Averell, & Brown, 2014). The distance between threshold b
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and the maximum start point A is quantified by B, such that b = A+B.
Together, these parameters generate a distribution of decision times DT . The observed
RT, however, also consists of stimulus–nonspecific components such as stimulus encoding, response
preparation and motor execution, which together make up non–decision time t0. The model assumes
that t0 simply shifts the distribution of DT , such that RT = DT + t0 (Luce, 1986). Hence, the
three key components of the LBA are (1) the speed of information processing, quantified by mean
drift rate ν; (2) response caution, quantified by distance from start point to threshold that averages
at b−A/2; and (3) non–decision time, quantified by t0.
The LBA has been applied to a number of perceptual discrimination paradigms (e.g., Cassey,
Gaut, Steyvers, & Brown, 2015; Cassey, Heathcote, & Brown, 2014; Forstmann et al., 2008, 2010;
Ho, Brown, & Serences, 2009; van Ravenzwaaij, Provost, & Brown, 2017). Recently, the LBA
has also been applied to preference data. For instance, Hawkins et al. (2014) applied the LBA
to consumer preference data toward mobile phones. In an adaptation of the LBA developed by
Trueblood et al. (2014), the model was fit to preference data of three kinds of context effects:
similarity, compromise, and attraction. Rodriguez et al. (2014) applied the LBA to inter–temporal
choice data and concluded that “perceptual and value–based decision–making may depend on
similar comparison and selection processes” (p. 7).
The interpretation of the drift rate parameter changes when applying sequential accumulator
models to preference data without an inherent correct answer. Rather than speed of information
processing, drift rate reflects the strength of preference for a choice option. For this application, we
define drift rates as representing a weighted sum of an option’s attribute values (amount, delay, and
probability). In other words, each attribute’s contribution to the strength of preference depends on
the importance or attention placed on each attribute, quantified by scaling parameters (or weights;
see the Model Implementation section for more details). This definition of preferential strength
allows us to test three specific accounts of how choice preferences vary with different levels of delay
and probability.
Specifically, we examine how preferences for the now/certain options are formed in relation to
the values of the choice attributes of the delayed/risky options. The first account (“proportional”)
assumes that the value of the now/certain option changes proportionally to different alternatives for
the delayed/risky option. The choice attributes (amount, delay, and probability) in the now/certain
and delayed/risky options have different weights, suggesting that the importance or attention placed
on each attribute varies between the two options. On the other hand, the “invariant” account simply
assumes that the absolute value (preferential strength) of the now/certain option remains constant
across all choice trials, irrespective of the attribute values of the delayed/risky option. Consequently,
this model suggests that a single absolute value for the now/certain option is estimated (that is,
a single drift rate across all trials – no scaling parameters or weights needed). This “invariant”
account resembles expected utility-based models, which assume a single fixed value for an option
regardless of the context (i.e., alternative options) in which a decision is made. The last account
(“symmetrical”) presents a compromise between the two aforementioned “extreme” accounts: while
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the value of the now/certain option does not remain constant, the choice attribute weights are
identical between the two options. For each model account, we examined linear and non-linear
(i.e., power transformations of each attribute’s values) functional forms for the drift rate ν, and
different assumptions relating to the upper starting point A. We formally describe these variants
of the LBA in the Model Implementation section below.
We fit the LBA to inter–temporal and risky choice data simultaneously. Thus, our work
presents the first attempt to examine the potential for a unifying underlying process that governs
preferences in both inter–temporal and risky choices.
Experiment 1
We set out to model people’s preferences on inter–temporal and risky choices separately.
Participants completed a task with two separate blocks of inter–temporal choice and risky choice
trials. We report the behavioral results of this experiment, as well as the modeling results provided
by fitting the LBA.
Method
Participants. Forty undergraduate students (26 female; Mage = 19.40) at the University
of New South Wales participated in return for course credit. For each participant, one of their
preferences from the risky choice trials was randomly selected. If the participant preferred the
risky option in that specific choice trial, the gamble was played for real (e.g., $200 with 50%
chance). In case of a win, the participant was paid 2% of the amount (e.g., $4 as 2% of $200) and
nothing otherwise. Those who preferred the sure option were paid $2 (i.e., 2% of $100 for sure)2.
Materials. The experiment consisted of 380 inter–temporal choice and 380 risky choice
trials. For the inter–temporal choices, participants had to indicate what they preferred: $100 now
or $X in D months, with $X varying from $120 to $500 in $20 increments (for a total of 20
amounts) and D varying from 2 months to 38 months in 2 month increments (for a total of 19
delays). Thus, every combination of amount and delay was presented to participants once as an
alternative to $100 now (D = 0).
For the risky choices, participants had to indicate what they preferred: $100 for sure or $X
with P% chance, with $X varying from $120 to $500 in $20 increments (for a total of 20 amounts)
and P varying from 5% to 95% in 5% increments (for a total of 19 probabilities). Thus, every
combination of amount and probability was presented to participants once as an alternative to
$100 for sure (P = 100%).
Procedure. Participants completed the experiment in two sessions, of 380 trials each (190
risky choice trials and 190 inter–temporal choice trials). Within a session the order of the trials
was blocked (i.e., all risky together, all inter–temporal together) and counterbalanced. The two
2At the outset, participants were told that one trial from the experiment would be selected and the gamble would
be played for real. To facilitate payment, the (pseudo)randomly selected trial always came from the risky choice
trials, but participants did not know this, thus creating the impression of equal incentives for both phases of the
experiment.
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sessions were separated by a minimum of three hours (i.e., some participants completed the sessions
on consecutive days, others in the morning and afternoon of the same day).
Implementation of the Model
We used a hierarchical Bayesian implementation of the LBA (Turner, Sederberg, Brown, &
Steyvers, 2013). Advantages of the hierarchical Bayesian framework include the ability to fit the
LBA to data with relatively few trials, because the model borrows strength from the hierarchical
structure. This advantage is important, as we are working with a task for which we essentially have
only a single trial per participant for each type of choice (one single combination of $X and D for
inter–temporal choices and a combination of $X and P% for risky choices). The Bayesian set–up
allows for using Markov chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) sampling, which is an efficient way of finding
the optimal set of parameters (Gamerman & Lopes, 2006; Gilks, Richardson, & Spiegelhalter, 1996;
van Ravenzwaaij, Cassey, & Brown, 2018).
We fit three different model accounts that differed on how they model the choice process:
proportional, symmetrical, and invariant. Within each model account we examined four different
assumptions (variants) relating to the starting point parameters and the functional form of the drift
rate. Specifically, the “2A” model-variant assumed two parameters for the upper range of starting
point A for each type of choice (i.e., AI for inter–temporal and AR for risky choices), whereas the
“4A” variant had four starting point parameters for each choice option in the task (i.e., in the
inter–temporal choice task AIN and AID for the now and delayed choice options, respectively, and
in the risky choice task ARC and ARR for the certain and risky choice options, respectively). The
“4A” variants assume that a response bias is associated with every choice option, indicating that
for some choice options less evidence might be required to reach a decision. For the drift rates,
we examined linear and nonlinear versions. Thus, for each model account we fit 4 model-variants:
linear-2A, linear-4A, nonlinear-2A, and nonlinear-4A. In total we fit 12 models. For all models
we assumed two parameters for threshold B (BI for inter–temporal and BR for risky choices). We
first describe the “proportional” model, then describe the two other model accounts by referring to
changes to the “proportional” model.
For the inter–temporal choice task, the linear “proportional” model (both the 2A and 4A
variants) included drift rates for the “now” and “delayed” options as follows:
νN = νN0 − αNX × ($X/20− 6)− αND × (19−D/2)
νD = νD0 − αDX × (25− $X/20)− αDD × (D/2− 1)
(1)
where νN and νD denote drift rates for the now and the delayed choice options, νN0 and νD0 denote
offset parameters for the now and the delayed choice options, $X denotes the amount in dollars for
the delayed choice option, D denotes delay in months for the delayed choice option, αNX and αDX
are amount scale parameters for the now and the delayed choice options, and αND and αDD are
delay scale parameters for the now and the delayed choice options. νN = νN0 if $X = 120 and D =
38 (the option that most favors the “now” choice). νD = νD0 if $X = 500 and D = 2 (the option
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that most favors the “delayed” choice). For the nonlinear version (both the 2A and 4A variants),
we applied a power transformation (β parameters), on the numerical values of amount and delay
of each option, thus adding two extra parameters to be estimated (same β for amount and delay
across the two options).
For the risky choice task, the linear “proportional” model (both the 2A and 4A variants)
included drift rates for the “certain” and “risky” options as follows:
νC = νC0 − αCX × ($X/20− 6)− αCP × (P/5− 1)
νR = νR0 − αRX × (25− $X/20)− αRP × (19− P/5)
(2)
where νC and νR denote drift rates for the certain and risky choice options, νC0 and νR0 denote
offset parameters for the certain and risky choice options, $X denotes the amount in dollars for
the risky choice option, P denotes the payout probability for the risky choice option, αCX and αRX
are amount scale parameters for the certain and the risky choice options, and αCP and αRP are
probability scale parameters for the certain and the risky choice options. νC = νC0 if $X = 120
and P% = 5 (the option that most favors the certain option). νR = νR0 if $X = 500 and P% =
95 (the option that most favors the risky option)3. As in the specification for the inter–temporal
choice task, the nonlinear drift rates for the risky choice task included power transformations (β
parameters) of each option’s amount values. Unlike amount and delay, we did not apply a power
transformation for probability (i.e., β = 1).
We fit two other models that test specific assumptions about the underlying choice process.
The first model (“invariant”), estimates a single νN parameter (i.e., drift rate for the now option)
for all inter–temporal choice trials and a single νC parameter (i.e., drift rate for the certain option)
for all risky choice trials. Conceptually, this simpler model assumes that the absolute value of
the now/certain option does not change with different alternatives for the delayed/risky option.
Essentially, the objectively invariant option would also be perceived as invariant by the decision
makers.
The final model (“symmetrical”) presents a compromise between the “proportional” model
and the “invariant”. The model assumes that αNX = αDX , αND = αDD , αCX = αRX , and αCP =
αRP . This means that contrary to the “invariant” model, the νN parameter and the νC parameter
are not fixed to a single value. Instead, drift rates for the now/certain option vary symmetrically
(though in the opposite direction) with drift rates for the delayed/risky option. Table 1 presents
the 12 models that we fit (3 model accounts × 4 variants) and their associated parameters.
The comparison of the “proportional”, the “invariant”, and the “symmetrical” models will
teach us something about the change in subjective evaluation of the now/certain choice option. Is
the subjective evaluation of the now/certain choice option fixed irrespective of the delayed/risky
choice option, does the subjective evaluation of the now/certain choice option vary symmetrically
with the delayed/risky choice option, or does the now/certain choice option vary non-symmetrically
but proportionally with the delayed/risky choice option? In addition, is the linear form of the drift
3Note that t0 is ﬁxed to be the same for the inter–temporal and the risky choice task.
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Table 1
Outline of the 12 models (3 model accounts: Proportional, Invariant, and Symmetrical × 4 variants:
Linear–2A, Linear–4A, Nonlinear–2A, and Nonlinear–4A) and their parameters that were fit to the
data of Experiment 1. In addition to the parameters listed below, all models include a single t0 (non–
decision time) and two threshold parameters BI and BR for the inter–temporal and risky choice
tasks, respectively.
Model P Task Parameters
Proportional
Linear–2A 17 I AI , νN0 , αNX , αND , νD0 , αDX , αDD
R AR, νC0 , αCX , αCP , νR0 , αRX , αRP
Nonlinear–2A 20 I AI , νN0 , αNX , αND , βIX , βID , νD0 , αDX , αDD
R AR, νC0 , αCX , αCP , βRX , νR0 , αRX , αRP
Linear–4A 19 I AIN , AID , νN0 , αNX , αND , νD0 , αDX , αDD
R ARC , ARR , νC0 , αCX , αCP , νR0 , αRX , αRP
Nonlinear–4A 22 I AIN , AID , νN0 , αNX , αND , βIX , βID , νD0 , αDX , αDD
R ARC , ARR , νC0 , αCX , αCP , βRX , νR0 , αRX , αRP
Invariant
Linear–2A 13 I AI , νN , νD0 , αDX , αDD
R AR, νC , νR0 , αRX , αRP
Nonlinear–2A 16 I AI , νN , νD0 , αDX , αDD , βDX , βDD
R AR, νC , νR0 , αRX , αRP , βRX , βRP
Linear–4A 15 I AIN , AID , νN , νD0 , αDX , αDD
R ARC , ARR , νC , νR0 , αRX , αRP
Nonlinear–4A 18 I AIN , AID , νN , νD0 , αDX , αDD , βDX , βDD
R ARC , ARR , νC , νR0 , αRX , αRP , βRX
Symmetrical
Linear–2A 13 I AI , νN0 , νD0 , αIX , αID
R AR, νC0 , νR0 , αRX , αRP
Nonlinear–2A 16 I AI , νN0 , νD0 , αIX , αID , βIX , βID
R AR, νC0 , νR0 , αRX , αRP , βRX
Linear–4A 15 I AIN , AID , νN0 , νD0 , αIX , αID
R ARC , ARR , νC0 , νR0 , αRX , αRP
Nonlinear–4A 18 I AIN , AID , νN0 , νD0 , αIX , αID , βIX , βID
R ARC , ARR , νC0 , νR0 , αRX , αRP , βRX
Note: P = Number of free parameters per participant; I = Inter–temporal choice task;
R = Risky choice task.
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rate sufficient to explain how preference is accumulated, or can more complex nonlinear relationships
provide a better account for strength of preference? Do we need separate starting points for each
choice option in the task (4A models) to account for a priori biases for either the now/delayed
or the certain/risky options, or two starting points for the inter–temporal choice and risky choice
tasks (2A models)? We will use formal model comparison to find the account best supported by
the data. Details on starting values, prior distributions, and number of iterations may be found in
the Appendix.
Subjective value and discounted utility models. To compare the performance of the
LBA model against standard approaches in risky and inter–temporal choice, we fit a Prospect
Theory model to the risky choice data (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992),
and a hyperbolic discounting model to the inter–temporal choice data (Myerson & Green, 1995).
For the risky choice data, the subjective value V of a risky prospect is given by
V =
∑
w(pi)u(Xi) (3)
where w(pi) is the decision weight (transformed value of objective probability p, as produced by
a probability weighting function; see Equation 5) and u is the utility of receiving reward X. For
utility u, we assume a power utility function
u(X) = Xα (4)
For the probability weighting function, we used the two-parameter version proposed by Gonzalez
and Wu (1999):
w(p) =
δpγ
δpγ + (1− p)γ
(5)
where γ represents the curvature and δ represents the elevation of the weighting function.
Similarly, for the inter–temporal choice data, the discounted value V of a delayed option is
V =
∑
D(ti)u(Xi) (6)
where D represents the discount function. We used a two-parameter variant of hyperbolic discount-
ing as below:
D(t) =
1
(1 + kt)s
(7)
where k is the discounting rate and s governs the curvature of the hyperbola (Myerson & Green,
1995). For utility, we used the same power function as for the risky choice task (Equation 4).
Both models assume deterministic choice, that is, the choice option with the highest expected
or discounted value is selected. Here we assumed a probabilistic choice rule, where the probability
of choosing the safe option over the risky option (p(S)), or the probability of choosing the now
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option over the delayed (p(N)) is given by the softmax rule:
p(S) =
exp{θV (S)}
exp{θV (S)}+ exp{θV (R)}
(8)
where θ denotes the sensitivity (inverse-temperature) parameter, indicating the degree to which
choice probabilities adhere to numerical differences between V (S) and V (R) in risky choice, and
V (N) and V (D) for inter–temporal choice. To find the best fitting parameters, we used maximum
likelihood estimation techniques. We fit both models to the risky and inter–temporal choice data
simultaneously for each participant (6 parameters in total: α, γ, δ, k, s, θ). The procedure was a
combination of grid search (300 different starting points for each set of parameters) and Nelder-
Mead simplex methods (Nelder & Mead, 1965).
Behavioral Results
Choice. All participants completed the experiment4. Two participants were excluded from
analysis: one participant had chosen the “delayed” option for every single choice, and another
participant had seemingly responded randomly, producing responses that seemed largely inconsis-
tent when compared against one another. Also, we excluded extreme RTs that were slower than
7s and faster than 250ms (2.8% of all trials). Preference data for the inter-temporal choice trials
can be found in the top-left panel of Figure 2. The figure shows group average proportion data.
Proportions close to 0, displayed in blue, indicate a uniform preference for the $100 now option.
Proportions close to 1, displayed in yellow, indicate a uniform preference for the delayed option.
The results show that participants prefer the now option when the delayed option does not pay
very well (i.e., amounts not much higher than $120) or when the delay is long (i.e., close to 38
months). In contrast, participants prefer the delayed option when the delayed option pays well
(i.e., amounts close to $500) or when the delay is short (i.e., close to now).
To examine the factors affecting choice of the smaller-sooner (SS; coded 0) or larger-later
options (LL; coded 1) in the inter–temporal choice trials, we performed a mixed–effects logistic
regression with amount and delay of the LL option as fixed effects (centered and scaled) and
participant-specific random intercepts and slopes (for amount and delay). As expected, there was
a significant positive effect of amount (b = 2.13, z = 8.940, p < .001), indicating that as amount
offered by the LL option increased, so did the likelihood of selecting the delayed option. In line
with the observations from Figure 2, as delay increased participants were more likely to select the
SS (“now”) option (b = −3.05, z = −3.06, p < .001).
Preference data for the risky choice trials can be found in the bottom-left panel of Figure 2.
The figure shows group average proportion data. Proportions close to 0, displayed in blue, indicate
a uniform preference for the risk-free option of $100. Proportions close to 1, displayed in yellow,
indicate a uniform preference for the risky option. The results show that participants prefer the
4All data, analyses, and modeling scripts from Experiments 1 and 2 are available on Open Science Framework:
https://osf.io/4dchn/. The analyses reported in this article contain all variables of interest and experimental condi-
tions that we tested.
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Figure 2 . Behavioral data of the inter–temporal and risky choice trials in Experiment 1 averaged
over participants. A) Proportion of preference data for inter–temporal choices. A proportion
of 0 (blue) indicates exclusive preference for the $100 now option, a proportion of 1 (yellow)
indicates exclusive preference for the delayed option. Black boxes represent proportions around
0.50. B) Proportion of preference data for risky choices. A proportion of 0 (blue) indicates exclusive
preference for the $100 certain option, a proportion of 1 (yellow) indicates exclusive preference for
the risky option. Black boxes represent proportions around 0.50. C) RT data for inter–temporal
choices. D) RT data for risky choices. Low RTs are closer to blue on the color spectrum.
certain option when the risky option does not pay very well (i.e., amounts not much higher than
$120) or when the payout probability is low (i.e., close to 5%). In contrast, participants prefer
the risky option when the risky option pays well (i.e., amounts close to $500) or when the payout
probability is high (i.e., close to 95%). We performed the same analysis for the risky choices, with
amount and payout probability of the risky option as fixed effects and participant-specific random
intercepts and slopes, which showed that both payout probability (b = 5.67, z = 12.03, p < .001)
and amount (b = 1.32, z = 8.78, p < .001) are significant predictors of risky choice rates. The
positive sign of both regression coefficients indicates that participants were more likely to select the
risky option when amount and payout probability increased.
Response Times. The choice data indicates, perhaps unsurprisingly, that people prefer
high payout, short delays, and high probability. What can we learn from the RT data? Overall,
higher RTs were associated with inter-temporal choices (M = 1, 862 ms) compared to risky choices
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(M = 1, 420 ms). Also, certain or now options were chosen faster (M = 1, 422 ms) than risky or
delayed options (M = 2, 031 ms). Figure 2C shows group-average RT data for the inter-temporal
choice trials. Low RTs are closer to blue on the color spectrum and high RTs are closer to yellow.
The results show that the more extreme preferences in terms of proportion are accompanied by
lower RTs (see also Dai & Busemeyer, 2014). The choices for which preferences varied among
participants (~50%; the black diagonal in Figure 2A) are accompanied by higher RTs (the yellow
diagonal in Figure 2C), indicating a lower absolute strength of preference.
Figure 2D shows group-average RT data for the risky choice trials. Similar to the inter-
temporal choice RTs, the results show that the more extreme preferences in terms of proportion
are accompanied by lower RTs. The choices for which preferences varied among participants (the
darker axis from the top-left to the mid-right in Figure 2B) are accompanied by higher RTs (the
yellow axis in Figure 2D), indicating a lower absolute strength of preference.
In sum, people prefer high payout, short delays, and high probability. As for response times,
people take less time making risky choices than inter-temporal choices, and take a relatively short
time to make choices for which response options are extreme. In the next section, we turn to the
modeling results. We are looking for two things: 1) Are strengths of preference observed in the
behavioral results reflected in the pattern of drift rates in the models we consider? 2) How do
people weigh delay and probability in their choices?
Modeling Results
Parameter convergence was satisfactory as indicated by the individual chains mixing prop-
erly.5 Numerically, we compare the “proportional”, the “invariant”, and the “symmetrical” models
(and their variants) by calculating the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC; Spiegelhalter, Best,
Carlin, & van der Linde, 2002), a measure which balances goodness of fit against model complex-
ity.6 DIC values for the 12 models can be found in Table 2. The table shows that in terms of the
DIC criterion, the best–fitting model is the linear–4A “proportional” model and the worst model
belongs to the “invariant” account (nonlinear–4A model). This suggests that decision makers’ abso-
lute valuation of the now and certain options in the inter–temporal and risky domains, respectively,
change with different alternatives (different values of delay and probability) for the delayed and
risky options. In addition, the best–fitting model shows that the linear functional form of the drift
rate and separate starting points for the drift process of each choice option provide better fits than
its competitors.
We examined posterior predictive data for the best fitting linear–4A “proportional” model,
and compared these to the behavioral data (posterior predictive data for the other two models –
invariant and symmetrical – can be seen in the Supplemental Materials available online). Figure 3
5The focus of the modeling results is on the LBA and we will refer to the expected and discounted utility models
(Prospect Theory and Hyperbolic Discounting) wherever necessary.
6DIC is similar to the well–known BIC and AIC measures. However, in hierarchical models, the number of free
parameters is not well–deﬁned. As such, DIC quantiﬁes model complexity as across–sample variability in model ﬁt
instead. Lower values of DIC indicate better support for a model from the data.
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Table 2
DIC values summed over participants for all 12 models fit to the Experiment 1 data set. The best
model for these data is the linear–4A proportional model (in bold).
Model P Deviance pD DIC
Proportional
Linear–2A 17 57,459.82 549.43 58,558.68
Nonlinear–2A 20 57,881.67 914.51 59,710.69
Linear–4A 19 57,135.14 651.98 58,439.09
Nonlinear–4A 22 57,885.15 920.59 59,726.34
Invariant
Linear–2A 13 65,653.85 382.53 66,418.90
Nonlinear–2A 16 65,652.03 490.78 66,633.61
Linear–4A 15 64,988.77 388.96 65,766.65
Nonlinear–4A 18 65,053.51 537.21 66,127.92
Symmetrical
Linear–2A 13 60,102.31 407.51 60,917.34
Nonlinear–2A 16 60,074.14 495.70 61,065.56
Linear–4A 15 59,576.31 471.22 60,518.74
Nonlinear–4A 18 59,758.51 555.81 60,870.14
Note: P = Number of free parameters per participant; De-
viance = -2 times the likelihood of the mean parameter es-
timate; pD = -2 times the mean likelihood of the overall
model + 2 times the likelihood of the mean parameter esti-
mate; DIC = Deviance+2pD.
indicates that the model fits the RT and choice data well. It provides good fits for response times
of all choice options, and accounts for observed choice proportions (see Choice panel).7 Figure 3
also shows choice simulations based on the best fitting parameters for the Prospect Theory and
Hyperbolic Discounting models. It can be seen that these models provide a good fit to the data,
almost indistinguishable from the predictions of the LBA model. In other words, accounting for RT
data (in addition to choice data) does not affect the way that the LBA accounts for and predicts
participants’ preferential choices.8
What can we learn from the resulting estimated parameters? Table 3 contains median values
of the group parameters of the best–fitting model (i.e., the linear–4A “proportional”; see Supple-
7It is important to note that every cell in our design contained only a single observation (i.e., any participant
contributed only a single choice for each amount/delay or amount/probability combination). As such, our data are
relatively noisy, and the model ﬁts reﬂect that noise.
8The Mean Squared Error (MSE) on the simulated choice proportions for each model and choice type,
1
n
∑n
i=1
(Ci − Cˆi)
2 (where n=380: the number of trials for each type of choice; and C: proportion of choices for the
delayed/risky options for each individual choice): LBAI = 0.083, Hyperbolic Discounting = 0.053, LBAR = 0.093,
Prospect Theory = 0.070. However, caution is advised when attempting direct quantitative comparisons between
the two modeling frameworks: 1) the LBA assumes deterministic choice whereas the PT and HD models assume
probabilistic choice (as they were implemented in this paper), 2) Diﬀerent methodologies were used to estimate the
parameters, and 3) the two modeling frameworks diﬀer in terms of model complexity (e.g., number of free parameters)
and functional form (see Pitt & Myung, 2002).
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Figure 3 . Posterior predictives of the linear–4A proportional model for RTs and choice data in
Experiment 1. For all panels, circles represent mean posterior predictive data (error bars indicate
95% credible intervals of the posterior) and squares represent experimental data. Crossed-out
squares (only for the Choice panel) indicate simulated predictive data for Prospect Theory (risky
choice task) and Hyperbolic Discounting (inter–temporal choice task).
mental Materials for group-level posterior distributions of parameters). Given the particular set
of delays, probabilities, and amounts we used, there are three things that the model parameters
indicate: first, amount factors more in the decision for inter–temporal choices than for risky choices
as evidenced by larger values for αNX and αDX than for αCX and αRX . Second, risk factors more
in the decision than delay as evidenced by larger values for αCP and αRP than for αND and αDD .
Finally, decisions are made quicker on average for risky than for inter–temporal choices as evidenced
by higher drift rates and a lower response threshold for risky (BR) than for inter–temporal choices
(BI)
9.
In order to delve more deeply into the modeling results, we examine individual drift rates
for each choice and each participant by entering the appropriate parameters into Equation 1 and
Equation 2. The difference between the resulting drift rates for all participants’ inter–temporal
choice data, νN − νD, can be found in Figure 4. A highly positive difference between the now drift
rate and the delayed drift rate, displayed in blue, indicates a strong preference for the now choice
option. A highly negative difference between the now drift rate and the delayed drift rate, displayed
in yellow, indicates a strong preference for the delayed choice option. The results show there are
considerable individual differences in the extent to which participants weigh amount and delay. For
example, P5 is mostly driven by the amount in dollars (as indicated by the predominantly vertical
transition in colors), whereas P1 tends to be driven by the delay (as indicated by the predominantly
horizontal transition in colors). We also see differences in the proportions of choices: participants
for whom yellow dominates generally prefer the “now” option, whereas participants for whom blue
dominates generally prefer the “delayed” option.
The difference between the resulting drift rates for all participants’ risky choice data, νC −
9Results from a parameter recovery analysis are presented in the Supplemental Materials
COGNITIVE MODELING OF RISKY INTER–TEMPORAL CHOICE 17
Table 3
Estimated parameters of the linear–4A proportional model of the data from Experiment 1. Dis-
played are the median parameter values of the group parameters, with a 50% credible interval of
the posterior presented in parentheses. Rows represent parameters and columns represent the two
group parameters.
Description Parameter µ σ
Inter–temporal Choice
Starting Points (A)
Now AIN 0.90 (0.50, 1.29) 3.27 (2.90, 3.68)
Delayed AID 2.18 (1.66, 2.57) 2.20 (1.75, 2.71)
Threshold BI 0.92 (0.71, 1.11) 1.11 (0.98, 1.28)
Inter–temporal drift rates (νN , νD)
Offset: Now νN0 2.96 (2.83, 3.09) 0.97 (0.87, 1.08)
Offset: Delayed νD0 3.43 (3.29, 3.55) 0.93 (0.81, 1.08)
Amount Scale: Now αNX 0.12 (0.10, 0.13) 0.13 (0.12, 0.15)
Amount Scale: Delayed αDX 0.12 (0.11, 0.13) 0.06 (0.06, 0.07)
Delay Scale: Now αND 0.13 (0.13, 0.14) 0.05 (0.05, 0.06)
Delay Scale: Delayed αDD 0.29 (0.27, 0.32) 0.22 (0.19, 0.24)
Risky Choice
Starting Points (A)
Certain ARC 0.43 (0.21, 0.71) 1.90 (1.68, 2.14)
Risky ARR 2.40 (2.05, 2.66) 1.75 (1.40, 2.22)
Threshold BR 0.91 (0.77, 1.03) 0.72 (0.62, 0.84)
Risky drift rates (νC , νR)
Offset: Certain νC0 3.20 (3.11, 3.29) 0.62 (0.53, 0.75)
Offset: Risky νR0 3.80 (3.69, 3.93) 0.62 (0.46, 0.84)
Amount Scale: Certain αCX 0.03 (0.03, 0.03) 0.03 (0.03, 0.03)
Amount Scale: Risky αRX 0.09 (0.08, 0.09) 0.06 (0.05, 0.07)
Probability Scale: Certain αCP 0.17 (0.16, 0.18) 0.07 (0.06, 0.07)
Probability Scale: Risky αRP 0.48 (0.45, 0.52) 0.27 (0.23, 0.30)
Non-Decision time t0 0.10 (0.07, 0.13) 0.12 (0.10, 0.13)
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Figure 4 . Absolute difference between the drift rates for the now and delayed options (νN − νD)
across choices and participants (i.e., “P” panels) for the inter–temporal choice trials in Experiment
1. Positive drift rates reflect a preference for the now option and are displayed in colors that are
closer to blue on the color spectrum. Negative drift rates reflect a preference for the delayed option
and are displayed in colors that are closer to yellow on the color spectrum.
νR, can be found in Figure 5. Note that participants are location–matched across the figures.
The results show that most participants had their strength of preference almost exclusively be
determined by probability, rather than amount (the transition among colors goes predominantly
along the vertical axis). There are still a few exceptions to this rule, for instance P12 who seems to
weigh amount and probability almost evenly. The other stand–out observation here is that people
are very risk–averse: across the board, we see a lot more blue than we see yellow.
Discussion
Experiment 1 showed that in an inter–temporal choice setting, people prefer high payouts
and short delays. In a risky choice setting, they prefer high payouts and high payout probabilities.
We have showed how RT data can augment the information provided by choice responses: in con-
junction with choice responses they give a measure of strength of preference. In our experiment,
decisions were made quicker on average for risky than for inter–temporal choices. In addition, the
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Figure 5 . Absolute difference between the drift rates for the certain and risky options (νC − νR)
across choices and participants (i.e., “P” panels) for the risky choice trials in Experiment 1. Positive
drift rates reflect a preference for the certain option and are displayed in colors that are closer to
blue on the color spectrum. Negative drift rates reflect a preference for the risky option and are
displayed in colors that are closer to yellow on the color spectrum.
formal comparison between the three model accounts of the LBA (“invariant”, “proportional”, and
“symmetrical”) revealed that the absolute attractiveness of the now/certain choice option changes
with different alternatives for the delayed/risky options as implemented by the “proportional”
model. The LBA produced almost identical predictions when compared to standard modeling ap-
proaches in risky and inter–temporal choice (such as Prospect Theory and Hyperbolic Discounting),
suggesting that accounting for RT data does not invalidate good predictions for the choice data: our
cognitive process model can account for both streams of behavioral data (choice and RT) equally
well.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 suggested that our instantiation of LBA can provide a good fit to the choice
and RT data from inter–temporal and risky choices based on a simple concept of accumulated
preferential strength. In Experiment 2 we examine whether our cognitive process model can provide
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a good explanation for choice and RT data when probability and delay combine in a single option.
We also test the three different accounts of the relationship between now/certain and delayed/risky
options (“invariant”, “symmetrical”, and “proportional”) and put LBA to the test by fitting a
standard discounted expected utility model to inter–temporal risky choice data. Thus, the main
objective of Experiment 2 is twofold: first, to extend the LBA to account for the combined effect of
probability and delay, and second, to examine whether the “proportional” model will be the best
fitting model.
On each trial of the experiment participants faced a choice between an option that was
available now with certainty and one that differed from the fixed option in terms of probability,
time of play, and amount of money. The full factorial combination of all the amounts, delays and
probabilities for which we wished to elicit preferences resulted in a very large number of trials (i.e.,
7,220; see Method). For this reason, in Experiment 2 we decided to collect a large amount of data
from a small number (4) of participants.
Method
Participants. Four graduate students (2 female; Mage = 23) at the University of New
South Wales participated in return for a $15 participation fee. In addition, they were paid $2 (i.e.,
outcome of the sure option) in each of 10 experimental sessions10.
Material. The experiment consisted of a total of 7,220 inter–temporal and risky choice
trials. For all choices, participants had to indicate what they preferred: $100 now for sure or $X
in D months with P% certainty, with $X varying from $120 to $500 in $20 increments (for a total
of 20 amounts), D varying from 2 months to 38 months in 2 month increments (for a total of 19
delays), and P varying from 5% to 95% in 5% increments (for a total of 19 probabilities). Thus,
every combination of amount, delay, and probability was presented to the participant once as an
alternative to $100 now for sure.
Procedure. Participants completed the experiment in 10 separate experimental sessions,
each comprising of 722 choice trials. Experimental sessions were again separated by a minimum of
three hours for each participant. Presentation of the sure option, and the inter–temporal and risky
option on the screen was counterbalanced across participants.
Implementation of the Model
Fitting the model to the inter–temporal and risky choice data in Experiment 1 revealed that
the linear–4A model was the best fitting variant within each model account, indicating that linear
drift rates and separate starting points for each choice option improves model fits and predictive
accuracy. We assumed the same model variant in Experiment 2, with linear drift rates and as many
parameters for the upper starting point A as the number of choice options (i.e., two: ANC for the
now/certain option and ADR for the delayed/risky option). Thus, in Experiment 2, we fit the
10As in Experiment 1, participants were told that one trial from the experiment would be selected and the gamble
would be played for real.
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same three model accounts (proportional, invariant, and symmetrical), but focusing on the linear–
2A variants of these model accounts. The linear–2A variant is identical to the linear–4A variant
in Experiment 1, with the only difference being that there were twice as many choice options
in Experiment 1 (four, hence four starting parameters A) compared to only two in Experiment 2
(hence the 2A). As in the implementation of the model in Experiment 1, we assumed one parameter
for threshold B, and one non–decision time parameter t0.
In Experiment 1 we observed that the same evidence accumulation (or strength of preference)
process provided a good fit to both risky and inter–temporal choices. This allowed us to assume that
expanding the drift rates to account for the combination of probability and delay in the same choice
option would provide a good account for the risky inter–temporal choice data. The definition of the
drift rates of the linear–2A “proportional” model for the risky inter–temporal choice task follows
the same principles as for the drift rates when the two dimensions are examined in isolation, that
is, a weighted sum of the attribute values of each option. Hence, we extended the model presented
in Experiment 1 to account for the joint effect of delay and probability as follows:
νNC = νNC0 − αNCX × (X/20− 6)− αNCD × (19−D/2)− αNCP × (P/5− 1)
νDR = νDR0 − αDRX × (25−X/20)− αDRD × (D/2− 1)− αDRP × (19− P/5)
(9)
where X, D, and P denote the amount in dollars, delay in months, and payout probability, re-
spectively, for the delayed/risky option, νNC and νDR denote drift rates for the now/certain and
the delayed/risky choice options, νNC0 and νDR0 denote offset parameters for the now/certain
and the delayed/risky choice options, αNCX and αDRX denote amount scale parameters for the
now/certain and the delayed/risky choice options, αNCD and αDRD denote delay scale parameters
for the now/certain and the delayed/risky choice options, and αNCP and αDRP denote risk scale
parameters for the now/certain and the delayed/risky choice options. νNC = νNC0 if X = 120, D
= 38, and P% = 5 (the option that most favors the “now/certain” choice). νDR = νDR0 if X =
500, D = 2, and P% = 95 (the option that most favors the “delayed/risky” choice).
This results in a total of 12 parameters to be estimated: ANC , ADR, B, t0, νNC0 , αNCX ,
αNCD , αNCP , νDR0 , αDRX , αDRD , and αDRP . Together, these parameters should account for the
distribution of response times and choice proportions for the combined inter–temporal and risky
choice data.
Just as for Experiment 1, we fit two other models that test specific assumptions about the
underlying choice process. The “invariant” model estimates a single νNC parameter (drift rate for
the now/certain option) for all inter–temporal risky choice trials. Thus, it replaces the four free
parameters (νNC0 , αNCX , αNCD , and αNCP ) from the definition of νNC under the “proportional”
model (see Equation 9) with one free parameter. Conceptually, this simpler model assumes that
the absolute value of the now/certain option does not change with different alternatives for the
delayed/risky option (i.e., same absolute value for the now/certain option across all trials). The
“invariant” model has nine free parameters to be estimated. The “symmetrical” model assumes
that drift rates for the now/certain option vary symmetrically (in the opposite direction) with drift
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rates for the delayed/risky option (i.e., αNCX = αDRX , αNCD = αDRD , and αNCP = αDRP ). This
model has nine free parameters to be estimated.
For Experiment 1, the “proportional” model fit the data better than both the “invariant” and
the “symmetrical” models. Here, we examine if the same result holds when the inter–temporal and
risky elements are combined in a single choice. Due to the small number of participants, we fit the
models to individual data (as opposed to hierarchical models in Experiment 1). We used formal
model comparison to find the account best supported by the data. Details on starting values, prior
distributions, and number of iterations may be found in the Appendix.
Discounted Expected utility model. As in Experiment 1, we also fit a discounted ex-
pected utility model for the inter–temporal risky choice data. The model combines (in a multi-
plicative way) a hyperbolic discounting of time and probabilities (see Vanderveldt et al., 2015):
D(t, θ) =
1
[(1 + kt)sd × (1 + hθ)sp ]
(10)
The first term in the denominator is identical to the two–parameter hyperbolic discounting model
used in Experiment 1 (see Equation 7). The second term is the probability discounting part,
where θ represents the odds against receiving a reward. It can be expressed in terms of actual
probabilities as θ = (1− p)/p. This form of probability discounting can be understood as reflecting
similar properties of the probability weighting function (Equation 5) used in Experiment 1 (see also
Vanderveldt et al., 2015). As in Experiment 1, the value of a delayed risky prospect is defined as
V =
∑
D(ti, θi)u(Xi). We used the same power utility function (Equation 4) and the softmax rule
(Equation 8) for probabilistic choice. The parameter estimation procedure was identical to that in
Experiment 1, apart from the fact that we used 500 starting points for each set of parameters.
Behavioral Results
Choice and response times. All participants completed the experiment. As in Experi-
ment 1 we excluded responses that were slower than 7s and faster than 250ms (0.47% of all trials).
Preference data for Experiment 2 can be found in Figure 6. The figure shows group average pro-
portion data. Proportions close to 1, displayed in yellow, indicate a uniform preference for the
delayed/risky choice. Proportions close to 0, displayed in blue, indicate a uniform preference for
the $100 now/certain choice. The results show that participants prefer the now/certain option
when the delayed/risky option does not pay very well (i.e., amounts not much higher than $120),
when the delay is long (i.e., close to 38 months), or when the payout probability is low (i.e., close
to 5%). In contrast, participants prefer the delayed/risky option when it pays well (i.e., amounts
close to $500), when the delay is short (i.e., close to now), or when the payout probability is high
(i.e., close to 95%).
We analyzed the data using a generalized linear mixed-effects model (Binomial distribution
and logit transformation) with amount, payout probability, and delay in months of the delayed/risky
option as fixed-effects predicting selection of the delayed/risky option, and random intercepts and
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slopes (amount, probability, and delay) for each participant. The results indicated a positive
relationship between amount (b = 1.75, z = 7.87, p < .001) and payout probability (b = 3.72, z =
10.61, p. < 001) and selection of the delayed/risky option on one hand, and a negative relationship
between delay (b = −2.27, z = −2.23, p = .026) and selection of the delayed/risky option on the
other hand.
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Figure 6 . Aggregate choice preference data of Experiment 2. Panels represent different probability
levels. A proportion of 0 (blue) indicates exclusive preference for the $100 now/certain option, a
proportion of 1 (yellow) indicates exclusive preference for the delayed/risky option.
Analogous to Experiment 1, the choice data indicate that people prefer high payouts, short
delays, and high probabilities. RT data for Experiment 2 can be found in Figure 7. The figure
shows group average RT data, binned in five equal groups. Low RTs are closer to blue on the color
spectrum and high RTs are closer to yellow on the color spectrum. The results show a clear pattern:
as the probability of the delayed/risky option increases, participants tend to slow down (especially
once the probability exceeds .5).
Modeling Results
Parameter convergence was satisfactory. DIC values for the three models can be found
in Table 4. We obtained the same results as in Experiment 1, with the “proportional” model
being the best–fitting model and the “invariant” being the worst–fitting model. Consequently, this
suggests that decision makers’ absolute valuation of the now/certain option changes with different
alternatives for the delayed/risky option.
Moving to the estimated parameters, we examined posterior predictive data for the linear–2A
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Figure 7 . RT data of Experiment 2. Panels represent different probability levels. Low RTs are
closer to blue on the color spectrum.
Table 4
DIC values summed over participants for all three models fit to the Experiment 2 data set. The best
model for these data is the proportional model (in bold).
Model P Deviance pD DIC
Proportional 12 37,028 41 37,110
Invariant 9 47,944 30 48,003
Symmetrical 9 38,033 31 38,096
Note: P = Number of free parameters per par-
ticipant; Deviance = -2 times the likelihood of
the mean parameter estimate; pD = -2 times the
mean likelihood of the overall model + 2 times the
likelihood of the mean parameter estimate; DIC
= Deviance+2pD.
“proportional” model, which are compared against the behavioral empirical data. The model fit the
data well (i.e., choice proportions and RTs; see Figure 8), only slightly underestimating response
times for the delayed/risky responses. Thus, extending the LBA to account for the combined effect
of time and probability and implementing the same principle of accumulated preference for inter–
temporal risky choices provides a parsimonious and psychologically plausible account of choice
behavior in this context. Figure 8 also plots simulated choice predictions of a discounted expected
utility model (multiplicative hyperboloid model; red triangle marker): compared to a discounted
expected utility model that has been found to provide good fits to inter–temporal risky choice
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data (see Vanderveldt et al., 2015), the LBA performs well with the additional benefit of providing
predictions for RT data too.11
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Figure 8 . Posterior predictives of the linear–2A proportional model for RTs (Now/Certain and
Delayed/Risky options) and choice data (Proportion of Now/Certain choices) in Experiment 2
(individuals 1-4 and group results). For all panels, white-filled points represent mean posterior
predictive data (error bars indicate 95% credible intervals of the posterior) and black-filled points
represent experimental data. The gray triangle marker (only for the Choice panel) indicates simu-
lated predictive data for the multiplicative hyperboloid model.
Table 5 contains median parameter values of the aggregate and individual participant param-
eters of the linear–2A “proportional” model. One aspect that clearly stands out is that probability
has a much stronger influence on the decision than either amount or delay, as evidenced by the fact
that the risk scale parameters (αCNR and αDRR) are substantially larger than the amount (αCNX ,
αRDX ) and delay scale parameters (αCND , αDRD). It is important to note that as in Experiment 1,
the larger effect of probability on participants’ choices is predicated on the range of amounts and
delays we used in this study.
In order to delve more deeply into this pattern, we examined individual drift rates for two
representative participants (i.e., based on their model parameter values) by entering the appropriate
parameters into Equation 9. Inspection of the individual parameter values (columns labelled 1 to 4
in Table 5) suggests that 2 out of 4 participants (i.e., P1 and P2) weigh probability more than delay
in their decisions, whereas the remaining two participants seem to equally weigh both dimensions
to make choices. The difference between the resulting drift rates for representatives of these two
types of participants’ (P2 and P3) risky inter–temporal choice data, νCN − νRD, can be found in
Figure 9. A highly positive difference between the now/certain drift rate and the delayed/risky
drift rate, displayed in blue, indicates a strong preference for the now/certain choice. A highly
negative difference between the now/certain drift rate and the delayed/risky drift rate, displayed
in yellow, indicates a strong preference for the delayed/risky choice. As expected based on the
individual parameter values, Figure 9 shows that the two participants have quite distinct choice
11The corresponding MSEs are: LBA = 0.134; Multiplicative Hyperboloid = 0.104
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Table 5
Estimated parameters of the proportional model in Experiment 2. Displayed are the median param-
eter values of the group (Group column) and individual (1 to 4 columns) parameters, with a 50%
credible interval of the posterior presented in parentheses.
Parameter Group 1 2 3 4
ANC 0.98 (0.01, 1.74) 0.00 (0.00, 0.01) 0.01 (0.00, 0.02) 2.41 (2.35, 2.47) 1.24 (1.17, 1.31)
ADR 2.39 (1.74, 4.27) 1.99 (1.92, 2.08) 1.40 (1.32, 1.49) 4.73 (4.16, 5.28) 3.86 (3.43, 4.37)
B 1.89 (1.28, 2.06) 1.04 (1.01, 1.07) 1.90 (1.87, 1.92) 1.87 (1.80, 1.95) 2.13 (2.11, 2.16)
νNC0 3.66 (3.53, 4.92) 3.45 (3.40, 3.50) 3.72 (3.68, 3.76) 5.43 (5.37, 5.49) 3.60 (3.56, 3.65)
νDR0 3.72 (3.15, 3.85) 3.77 (3.68, 3.85) 3.79 (3.72, 3.85) 3.81 (3.58, 4.05) 2.64 (2.48, 2.82)
αNCX 0.03 (0.01, 0.06) 0.01 (0.01, 0.01) 0.07 (0.07, 0.07) 0.05 (0.05, 0.06) 0.00 (0.00, 0.01)
αNCD 0.02 (0.01, 0.04) 0.01 (0.00, 0.01) 0.01 (0.00, 0.01) 0.05 (0.05, 0.06) 0.03 (0.03, 0.04)
αNCP 0.15 (0.11, 0.17) 0.17 (0.17, 0.18) 0.17 (0.17, 0.17) 0.13 (0.13, 0.14) 0.07 (0.07, 0.07)
αDRX 0.13 (0.10, 0.16) 0.09 (0.09, 0.09) 0.14 (0.13, 0.14) 0.20 (0.19, 0.22) 0.13 (0.11, 0.14)
αDRD 0.12 (0.01, 0.36) 0.01 (0.00, 0.01) 0.02 (0.01, 0.02) 0.45 (0.43, 0.48) 0.29 (0.27, 0.31)
αDRP 0.28 (0.19, 0.35) 0.28 (0.28, 0.29) 0.17 (0.17, 0.18) 0.50 (0.47, 0.53) 0.25 (0.23, 0.27)
t0 0.01 (0.00, 0.09) 0.11 (0.11, 0.12) 0.00 (0.00, 0.01) 0.04 (0.02, 0.05) 0.00 (0.00, 0.01)
profiles (see also individual parameter values in Table 5): P2’s choices are almost exclusively driven
by amount and payout probability as indicated by the vertical transitions in colors within and
across probability levels. P3 is considerably more risk averse than P2 as there is a lot more blue
than yellow in their panel. In addition, it appears that P3’s choices are also impacted by delay
(in addition to probability and amount) as shown by the mostly horizontal transitions in colors for
probability levels greater than 55% (see Supplemental Materials for individual differences in the
drift rates of the remaining two participants).
General Discussion
The search for understanding the principles that underlie choice in inter–temporal and risky
settings has been dominated by descriptive explanations of observed behavior. Choice anoma-
lies and deviations from EUT and DUT have led to the development of a vast number of util-
ity/subjective value-based models which propose different functional forms and additional param-
eters to account for observed behavioral effects. However, in recent years, decision scientists have
started to adopt cognitive processing models of choice behavior, suggesting a possible paradigm
shift within judgment and decision–making research (Bhatia & Mullett, 2016; Oppenheimer &
Kelso, 2015). Information processing models have been applied in many areas of decision–making
and have provided psychological explanations and insights into the dynamics underlying preferen-
tial choice (see e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010; Newell &
Bröder, 2008; Rodriguez et al., 2014; Trueblood et al., 2014; Usher & McClelland, 2001).
In this work, we followed a similar approach using an evidence accumulation model (LBA)
to account for inter–temporal and risky choices. The novelty of our approach rests on the fact
that the same modeling framework can be applied to two seemingly different types of choices,
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Figure 9 . Absolute difference between the drift rates for the now/certain and delayed/risky options
(νCN − νRD) for each choice in Experiment 2 for two participants (P2 and P3). Panels represent
different probability levels. Positive drift rates reflect a preference for the now/certain option and
are displayed in colors that are closer to blue on the color spectrum. Negative drift rates reflect a
preference for the delayed/risky option and are displayed in colors that are closer to yellow on the
color spectrum.
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without relying on assumptions derived from either EU or DU models. In addition, the current
work presents the first attempt to model the combined effect of probability and delay assuming
an evidence accumulation framework and relying on a simple specification (weighted sum) of how
preference is accumulated: drift rates provide a parsimonious and elegant measure for strength of
preference, combining the information provided by choice responses and RTs.
Choice behavior in inter–temporal and risky settings
In Experiment 1, we observed that people prefer larger, sooner to later, and certain to
risky payouts. A closer inspection of the results revealed that delay and payout probability had a
larger effect on choice for inter–temporal and risky options, respectively, as compared to amount.
Comparing inter–temporal and risky choices, amount appears to matter more in an inter–temporal
setting. This pattern is consistent with observations from previous research on delay and probability
discounting showing that changes in amount magnitude have a larger effect in an inter-temporal
than a risky choice setting (see Greenhow, Hunt, Macaskill, & Harper, 2015; Myerson, Green, Scott
Hanson, Holt, & Estle, 2003; Yi et al., 2006). For the particular set of delays, probabilities, and
amounts we used, a comparison of the relative importance of probability and delay across choice
settings (i.e., logit regression coefficients and model parameters) indicates that probability may
have a larger effect on choice compared to delay. Vanderveldt et al. (2015) found in a task where
both dimensions were combined that increasing the payout probability eliminated the effect of
delay, whereas when delay was increased, the effect of probability was reduced but not completely
eliminated. Nonetheless, they mentioned that the superior effect of probability may be an artifact
of the amounts and the range of delays and probabilities used in their study. This could also be
the case in our experiment: the larger effect of probability may have been the result of the range
in which we manipulated amount and delay (probability is naturally constrained between 0 and 1).
With longer delays (longer than 38 months that we used in this experiment) and different starting
and ending points for the range of amounts (smaller than $120 and larger than $500 that we
used in this experiment), the relative importance of delay could have been different. Alternatively
and consistent with our results, probability may be generally more salient than delay (see also
Konstantinidis, van Ravenzwaaij, & Newell, 2017).
RT data showed that risky choices were made on average faster than inter–temporal choices.
Participants’ responses were slower when risky or delayed options were more attractive than the
default option of $100 now or with certainty. In addition, clear preferences in terms of proportion
produced shorter RTs. These results are suggestive of the dynamic nature of inter–temporal and
risky choice, indicating that the use of static and descriptive models of choice may hinder our
understanding of how preferences and choices are formed (see Dai & Busemeyer, 2014).
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to elicit preferences for the factorial combination of a wide
range of amounts, payout probabilities, and delays. This resulted in a very large amount of delayed
risky options being offered as choice alternatives to a fixed amount now-certain choice option. While
this design allowed us to provide more accurate individual model parameter estimates, the small
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sample size in this experiment (i.e., 4) does not allow strong conclusions to be drawn regarding
the generalizability of the behavioral patterns found in the data. Figure 9 shows that there is
considerable variation in participants’ choice patterns. However, the cognitive modeling analyses
and the way that drift rates are defined (weighted sums and scaling parameters) allowed us to
quantify and explain individual differences, and the extent to which participants weighed each
dimension in their decision-making behavior.
Perspectives on modeling probability and delay
We used formal model comparison to pit three different variants of LBA against each other
that differed in the assumptions they make about the absolute evaluation of the now/certain choice
option.12 In both experiments, the “proportional” model (with as many starting point parameters
as the available choice options and linear drift rates) fit the data best, suggesting that the absolute
attractiveness of the now/certain choice option cannot be judged in a vacuum. This goes against
classic expected and discounted utility models which assume that the subjective value of an option
is fixed and the product of a utility function paired with a discounting function (inter–temporal
choice) or a probability weighting function (risky choice). Our cognitive process model makes
no such assumptions; instead the definition of the drift rates suggests that preference for each
option is formed through a weighted sum of its attributes (money, delay, and probability) and it
is dependent on the numerical value of the attributes of the alternative option. However, one can
assume different functional forms for the definition of drift rates and the way amount, probability,
and delay combine. We tested this assumption by allowing the drift rates to have nonlinear forms,
but this led to poorer fits compared to the linear forms of the drift rates. A complementary approach
is to assume that drift rates incorporate the functional forms from existing models (such as those
used in PT and HD) in determining preferences for choice alternatives (e.g., Dai & Busemeyer,
2014). In this sense, accumulated preference over time is governed by discounted or subjective
utility valuations of delayed risky prospects (e.g., Rodriguez et al., 2014). Future research can
determine the practical and theoretical advantages of implementing and testing such models. The
objective of the present work was to present a process model which takes into account response
times and assumes the same modeling and processing framework for both types of preferential
choice.
We also compared the performance of our cognitive process model against standard ap-
proaches, such as Prospect Theory in risky choice and Hyperbolic Discounting in inter–temporal
choice. We also attempted a combination of these two models (i.e., the multiplicative hyperboloid
model) when probability and delay appear in the same choice option (Vanderveldt et al., 2015). In
both Experiments 1 and 2, we observed that predictions from these models were almost identical
to those of the LBA, indicating that assuming a modeling framework akin to attribute-wise models
and accounting for choice response times provide an equally plausible account of choice behavior.
12Our model also assesses “relative” attractiveness and preferences since the numerical value of the now/certain
option is also dependent on the numerical value of the delayed/risky option.
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The additional benefits from using our cognitive process model are that the LBA provides predic-
tions on two streams of behavioral data, choice proportions and RTs (while standard approaches
are only concerned with the former, and in most cases at the aggregate level) and it also provides an
economic way (weighted sum of attribute values) to model the effect of probability and delay when
they are treated independently from each other, but also when combined. Glöckner and Herbold
(2011) showed that Cumulative Prospect Theory can provide adequate (“reasonably good”, p. 94)
descriptions of aggregate choice behavior in risky choice tasks, but they suggested that accounting
for individual choice behavior and the underlying choice process, models such as DFT (an evidence
accumulation model; see Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) are more appropriate.
The fact that our instantiation of the LBA assumes weighted comparisons between choice
options makes it analogous to attribute–based models of inter–temporal and risky choice. These
models assume that preferential choice between options is not necessarily based on underlying
delay or probability discounting functions, but it is rather driven by direct comparisons between
the attributes of each option (see e.g., Brandstätter et al., 2006; Cheng & González-Vallejo, 2016;
González-Vallejo, 2002; Read, Frederick, & Scholten, 2013; Scholten & Read, 2010). Attentional
focus or importance placed on each attribute is instantiated by weights. The scaling parameters
for amount, delay, and probability in the drift rates of the LBA can be conceived as serving the
same purpose (for similar ideas see, Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; Read et al., 2013).
Our modeling analysis also adds to recent attempts that employed evidence accumulation
models to account for effects in risky and inter–temporal choice. For example, Dai and Busemeyer
(2014) found that an attribute–wise diffusion model, based on absolute comparisons between the
dimensions of money and time, could account for three inter–temporal choice effects. Rodriguez et
al. (2014) used the LBA in an inter–temporal choice setting and concluded that delayed decision–
making can be also explained by sequential sampling mechanisms. Our current work extends these
theoretical and practical observations and presents LBA as a model which accounts for inter–
temporal and risky decision–making independently but also when the two dimensions combine in
a singe choice option. The model fits the combined choice data well (see Figures 3 and 8) without
incorporating trade–offs between probability and time (as is required in the probability and time
trade–off model Baucells & Heukamp, 2010, 2012), and without assuming any particular functional
form for probability and delay discounting (as is required in the multiplicative hyperboloid model;
Vanderveldt et al., 2015). In addition, the LBA naturally accounts for response times and imple-
ments them in the decision process as an important component of developing a preferential strength
for each option. Taking all these facets together, our work presents the first attempt to model the
combined effect of probability and delay through an evidence accumulation process, and to provide
psychological explanations about preferential choice that rely on the simultaneous examination of
choice and RT data.
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Appendix
Distributional Choices
Experiment 1
Starting values for the MCMC chains for individual parameters were drawn from the follow-
ing distributions: BI ∼ N(1.2, 0.12)|(0,∞), BR ∼ N(1, 0.1)|(0,∞), AD ∼ N(2, 0.2)|(0,∞), AR ∼
N(1.75, 0.175)|(0,∞), νN0 ∼ N(3, 0.3)|(0,∞), νD0 ∼ N(3, 0.3)|(0,∞), νC0 ∼ N(3.5, 0.35)|(0,∞),
νR0 ∼ N(3, 0.3)|(0,∞), αNX ∼ N(0.11, 0.311)|(−3,∞), αND ∼ N(0.15, 0.315)|(−3,∞), αDX ∼
N(0.15, 0.315)|(−3,∞), αDD ∼ N(0.3, 0.33)|(−3,∞), αCX ∼ N(0.06, 0.036)|(−3,∞), αCR ∼
N(0.16, 0.316)|(−3,∞), αRX ∼ N(0.1, 0.31)|(−3,∞), αRR ∼ N(0.4, 0.34)|(−3,∞), and t0 ∼
N(0.15, 0.015)|(0,∞). In case of any of the 4-A models, starting values for both the now/delayed
and the certain/risky starting points were drawn from the same distribution as indicated above. In
case of the non-linear models, βNX , βND , βDX , βDD ∼ N(−0.3, 0.27)|(−3,∞) and βCX , βCR , βRX ,
βRR ∼ N(0, 0.3)|(−3,∞). The notation ∼ N(, ) indicates that values were drawn from a normal
distribution with mean and standard deviation parameters given by the first and second number
between parentheses, respectively. The notation |(, ) indicates that the values sampled from the
normal distribution were truncated between the first and second numbers in parentheses.
The hierarchical set–up prescribes that all individual parameters come from a truncated
Gaussian group–level distribution (truncated to positive values only). Thus, for each parameter
to be estimated, we are estimating a group level mean parameter and a group level standard
deviation parameter. All group level mean parameters are normally distributed, both Bµs ∼
N(1, 0.3)|(0,∞), ADµ ∼ N(2, 1)|(0,∞), ARµ ∼ N(1.75, 1)|(0,∞), all νµs ∼ N(3, 1.5)|(0,∞), all
αµs ∼ N(0, 1)|(0,∞), and t0µ ∼ N(0.15, 0.07)|(0,∞). In case of any of the 4-A models, both
the now/delayed and the certain/risky options had the same prior for starting point as indicated
above. In case of the nonlinear models, all βµs ∼ N(0, 1)|(−3,∞). All group level standard
deviation parameters are gamma distributed, with a shape and a scale parameter of 1. Starting
values for the MCMC chains for group level µ parameters were drawn from the same distributions
as those for the individual parameters, and starting values for group level σ parameters were derived
from starting value distributions for the individual parameters by dividing the mean by 10 and the
standard deviation by 2. These prior settings are quite uninformative, and are based on previous
experience with parameter estimation for the LBA model. As a result, the specific settings will not
have a large influence on the shape of the posterior. For more details on distributional choices for
the priors, we refer the reader to Turner et al. (2013).
For sampling, we used 32 interacting Markov chains and ran each for 1,000 burn-in iterations
followed by 1,000 iterations after convergence. The two tuning parameters of the differential evolu-
tion proposal algorithm were set to standard values used in previous work: random perturbations
were added to all proposals drawn uniformly from the interval [-.001, .001]; and the scale of the
difference added for proposal generation was set to γ = 2.38× (2K)−0.5, where K is the number of
parameters per participant. The MCMC chains blocked proposals separately for each participant’s
parameters, and also blocked the group–level parameters in {µ, σ} pairs.
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Experiment 2
Starting values for the MCMC chains for individual parameters were drawn from the fol-
lowing distributions: B ∼ N(2, 0.2)|(0,∞), both As ∼ N(2, 0.2)|(0,∞), νNC0 ∼ N(6, 0.6)|(0,∞),
νDR0 ∼ N(6, 0.6)|(0,∞), αNCX ∼ N(0.1, 0.01)|(0,∞), αNCD ∼ N(0.15, 0.015)|(0,∞), αNCR ∼
N(0.2, 0.02)|(0,∞), αDRX ∼ N(0.1, 0.01)|(0,∞), αDRD ∼ N(0.15, 0.015)|(0,∞), αDRR ∼
N(0.2, 0.02)|(0,∞), and t0 ∼ N(0.2, 0.02)|(0,∞).
Priors for all individual parameters are normally distributed, B ∼ N(2, 2)|(0,∞), both As
∼ N(2, 2)|(0,∞), νNC0 ∼ N(6, 6)|(0,∞), νDR0 ∼ N(6, 6)|(0,∞), αNCX ∼ N(0.1, 0.1)|(0,∞),
αNCD ∼ N(0.15, 0.15)|(0,∞), αNCR ∼ N(0.2, 0.2)|(0,∞), αDRX ∼ N(0.1, 0.1)|(0,∞), αDRD ∼
N(0.15, 0.15)|(0,∞), αDRR ∼ N(0.2, 0.2)|(0,∞), and t0 ∼ N(0.2, 0.2)|(0,∞).
For sampling, we used 32 interacting Markov chains and ran each for 1,000 burn-in iterations
followed by 1,000 iterations after convergence. The two tuning parameters of the differential evolu-
tion proposal algorithm were set to standard values used in previous work: random perturbations
were added to all proposals drawn uniformly from the interval [-.001, .001]; and the scale of the
difference added for proposal generation was set to γ = 2.38× (2K)−0.5, where K is the number of
parameters per participant. The MCMC chains blocked proposals separately for each participant’s
parameters, and also blocked the group–level parameters in {µ, σ} pairs.
